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RATIONALITY AND INJUSTICE IN
PHYSICIAN-ASSISTED SUICIDE
ROBERT

A.

BURT*

"If you can keep calm when everyone around you is losing it,
then you don't really understand the situation." So goes the mod
em variation on the old saying, but the dominant vocabulary in our
contemporary public discussions about physician-assisted suicide ig
nores this wisdom. In litigative or academic forums, the talk tends
to focus on abstract principles and hypothetical cases. It is the ab
stractions and hypotheticals that obscure the complexity, the gritti
ness, and the disturbing reality of this subject. To remain coolly
rational about physician-assisted suicide is, in a fundamental sense,
to misunderstand all that is truly at stake.
Constitutional adjudication is especially vulnerable to this kind
of rationalistic and distanced misunderstanding. The judicial delib
eration revealed in the Ninth and Second Circuit court opinions is a
prime example of this affliction.! Consider the way that both courts
addressed whether withholding or withdrawing life-prolonging
medical treatment was different from providing treatment intended
to hasten death. Both courts asserted that there was no logical dif
ference between physicians' conduct in these two circumstances.2
The Second Circuit made this logical claim the center-piece of its
ruling that it was irrational for the state to authorize physicians to
withhold or withdraw care while prohibiting assisted suicide.
It is of course true that under both circumstances, the patient's
death is the foreseeable result of the physician's conduct and in this
sense, at least, there is no difference between the two circum
stances. But when the courts asserted that there were no other sali
ent or important differences between the physician's conduct under
the two circumstances, they ignored the testimony of many physi
cians-including the assembled representative physicians in the

*

Alexander M. Bickel Professor of Law, Yale University.
See Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997);
Compassion in Dying v. Washington, 79 F.3d 790 (9th Cir. 1996), rev'd sub nom. Wash
1.

ington v. Glucksberg, 138 L. Ed. 2d 772 (1997).
2. See Compassion in Dying, 79 F.3d at 822-23; Quill, 80 F.3d at 728-30.
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American Medical Association3-that acquiescing in a patient's re
fusal of life-saving treatment feels different from injecting or even
prescribing lethal medication at a patient's request. Perhaps the
distinction is irrational; perhaps it is logical to.say that the physician
is killing the patient in both cases. However, overriding the as~
serted difference on logical grounds amounts to a claim that the
public forum's distinctively abstract and remote mode of talking
about these events is the correct mode of understanding.
If we give ourselves room for the disturbing, unsettling, and
often powerfully irrational elements that attend the intimacies of
the death watch, we would-and I believe we should-be much
more respectful of this testimony froin physicians. More than most
people, physicians are in regular and recurrent contact with death.
This does not mean that most physicians are comfortable with this
contact.4 Relentless technological assaults against the possibility of
dying, and refusals to ever acquiesce in the inevitability of death,
are common behavior among physicians. The very relentlessness of
this physician behavior speaks to the disturbing and aversive char
acter of their confrontations with death. During the past two de
cades, many people outside and inside the medical profession have
struggled to change this technological assaultive ethos and to make
physicians more comfortable with acquiescing in the inevitability of
death and remaining available to comfort their dying patients. One
of the principal instruments for promoting this change has been to
cultivate physicians' respect for patients' wishes to refuse or to dis
continue life-prolonging treatments. This cultivation has itself not
been easy to accomplish, even though its logical force seems unas
sailable. In the words of a 1970s Broadway play later made into a
popular movie, the core question should be "Whose Life Is It, Any
way?" The obvious logical answer to this question is that the life is
the patient's not the physician's; therefore, the patient should de
cide what the physician can and cannot do to prolong his life.
Whatever the source for physicians' resistance to this logic,
that resistance has been strong and has not been overcome in the

3. See Council on Scientific Affairs, American Med. Ass'n, Good Care o/the Dy
ing Patient, 275 JAMA 474, 477 (1996); see also Amicus Curiae Brief of the American
Medical Association et aI., app. B at 11a, Vacco v. Quill, 117 S. Q. 36 (1996) (No. 95
1858).
4. See generally FREDERIC W. IiAFFERTY, INTO THE VALLEY: DEATH AND THE
SOCIALIZATION OF MEDICAL STUDENTS (1991).
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day-to-day practice· of medicine.s This resistance persists even
though the abstract principle has been unanimously endorsed in al
most every imaginable public forum-including the Supreme Court
in its 1990 Cruzan opinion which assumed, though it did not quite
proclaim, that patients had a constitutionally protected liberty in
terest to refuse life-prolonging medical treatment.6 Nevertheless,
for some set of stubbornly persistent reasons, many physicians have
difficulty in acting on the rational premise that, in their struggles
against illness and death, only the patient's life is at stake. 7
As a society we may be close to overcoming this physician
resistance; it may be that the principle of respect for patient's
wishes to terminate treatment and accept the inevitability of death
is now within the possibility of realization in the practice of
medicine. I am convinced that this is a correct principle and a
5. See Mildred Solomon et aI., Decisions Near the End of Life: ProfesSional Views
on Life-Sustaining Treatments, 83 AM. J. Pus. HEALTH 14 (1993). Solomon notes that:
[p]hysicians and nurses hold some views that make it difficult for them to act
in ways that would be consistent with their own expressed support for patient
autonomy. Although clinicians' views are congruent in many ways with those
put forth by authorities in ethics and law, on at least three critical issues
withdrawal of treatment, the distinction between 'ordinary' and 'extraordi
nary' treatment, and the provision of nutrition and hydration-many clinicians
differ with current national recommendations.... Most clinicians interviewed
were uncertain about what the law, ethics, and their respective professional
standards say. . .. In addition to this uncertainty, the interviewed respondents
reported being less likely to withdraw treatments than to withhold them for a
variety of other reasons, including psychological discomfort with actively stop
ping a life-sustaining intervention; discomfort with the public nature of the act,
which might occasion a lawsuit from disapproving witnesses even if the deci
sion were legally correct; and fear of sanction by peer review boards.
Id. at 19.
6. See Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261 (1990). The
Court in Cruzan stated:
[T]he principle that a competent person has a constitutionally protected lib
erty interest in refusing unwanted medical treatment may be inferred from our
prior decisions .

. . . [F]or purposes of this case, we assume that the United States Constitution
would grant a competent person a constitutionally protected right to refuse
lifesaving hydration and nutrition.
Id. at 278-79.
7. Commentators have reported that
[S]ome of the physicians expressed discomfort about openly soliciting patients'
views on what would constitute an acceptable quality of life. They tended not
to acknowledge explicitly to patients (or their families) that many termination
of-treatment decisions involve personal judgments about quality of life as well
as clinical considerations about medical efficacy.
See Solomon et aI., supra note 5, at 19.
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wholesome corrective to past assaultive medical practices. For the
moment, moreover, I am prepared to assume that the resistance of
many physicians (and non-physicians) to acknowledge the logical
equivalence of acting on a patient's wish to refuse life-prolonging
treatment and a patient's wish to obtain death-dispensing treatment
is itself irrational. Does it then follow that the proper course of
action, as the Second and Ninth Circuit courts have held, is to over
ride this illogical resistance and to proclaim that because patients
have a right to discontinue life-prolonging medical treatment, they
also have an equivalent right to physicians' assistance in hastening
death?
The Fourteenth Amendment demands that all persons be guar
anteed the equal protection of the laws. The constitutional syllo
gism would thus appear to require that irrational distinctions
between logically equivalent people must be overturned. If the
law's logic is the proper way to think about physician-assisted sui
cide, then judicial invalidation of the state prohibitions would seem
to follow ineluctably.
But I want to explore a different kind of logic for thinking
about this issue: a logic that starts from the premise that death is a
deeply disturbing event for all its witnesses. I want to explore what
we might call a logic of irrationality. I must of course speculate in
this exploration. We know that most people find it disturbing to
confront death, and that physicians in particular experience consid
erable discomfort. There is, however, very little firm data explain
ing the sources of this discomfort; and, in particular, there is almost
no data about the psychological impact on physicians when they
view themselves as responsible for, or as participants in, their pa
tients' deaths.s We do know that physicians work strenuously to
avoid the death of their patients; this is the normatively approved
social role of physicians, and not aberrational or irrational conduct.
We also know that in pursuing this socially sanctioned goal, many
physicians have been unwilling to accede to, or even to acknowl
edge the existence or propriety of, patients' refusals of life-prolong
ing medical treatment. 9
8. See, e.g., Miles Edwards & Susan Tolle, Disconnecting a Ventilator at the Re
quest ofa Patient Who Knows He Will Then Die: The Doctor's Anguish, 117 ANNALS OF
INTERNAL MED. 254 (1992).
9. See Howard Brody et aI., Withdrawing Intensive Life-Sustaining Treatment
Recommendations for Compassionate Clinical Management, 336 NEW ENG. J. MED. 652
(1997) ("[Hospital s]taff members are highly skilled in aggressive life-extending treat
ment . . .. Forced to choose between what they were trained to do and what they were
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I would speculate that this stubbornly persistent unwillingness
among physicians is based on a widespread belief that their acquies
cence in patients' refusals would somehow render physicians re
sponsible for, and direct participants in, their patients' deaths. It is
easy to identify the logical error in this belief. A patient and his
physician are separate individuals; and when the patient makes an
autonomous choice for death, that decision is his responsibility
alone.
What if there is a different logic at work between many physi
cians and patients, a logic of irrationality arising from the psycho
logical stress of impending death and its attendant dissolution of the
conventionally perceived boundaries of an "intact self"? What if
this irrational sense of dissolved boundaries is especially salient to
physicians as a group, more so than to patients, because the daily
work of physicians brings them constantly into contact with dYing
and its attendant stresses? This might explain the persistent unwill
ingness among physicians to acknowledge that their autonomous
patients were alone responsible for choosing their deaths.10 If this
explanation is credible, what will happen to this widespread belief
in the new era-this relatively recent and still imperfectly imple
mented era-when physicians are normatively obliged to assent to
their patients' decisions to refuse life-prolonging treatment? Here
are two possibilities: (1) perhaps physicians who have strenuously,
and until quite recently, ignored the logical proposition that they
and their dying patients are autonomously separate individuals, will
suddenly awaken to the force of this proposition, and will no longer
be afflicted by their past irrational views; (2) or perhaps physicians
still hold this irrational view, confusing themselves with their dying
patients, but this persistent irrationality will find a different expres
sion in this new era of mandated respect for patients' autonomous
rights.
never trained to do, physicians and nurses may continue aggressive therapy well beyond
the point at which patients or families (or the health care professionals themselves)
would prefer to stop."); see also Alfred Connors et aI., A Controlled Trial to Improve
Care for Seriously fll Hospitalized Patients: The Study to Understand Prognoses and
Preferences for Outcomes and Risks of Treatments (SUPPORT), 274 JAMA 1591,1594
(1995) (providing statistics showing that when patients expressed preferences to various
hospital staff members for withholding cardiopulmonary resuscitation, "only 47% of
their physicians accurately reported this preference").
to. For a speculative exploration of the psychology of boundary dissolutions in
interactions between patients and physicians where death is inevitable, see ROBERT A.
BURT, TAKING CARE OF STRANGERS: THE RULE OF LAw IN DOcrOR-PATIENT RELA
TIONS 92-123 (1979).
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If the first possibility is the truth of the matter, then we might

confidently conclude that, whatever other objections might be con
sidered regarding physician-aSsisted suicide, we should acknowl
edge the logical equivalences between physician involvements in
patient deaths, whether those deaths occur through physicians' ac
tions withdrawing a ventilator or injecting lethal medication. If,
however, the second possibility is the truth, then we should hesitate.
I do not know which possibility is the truth. It is extraordina
rily difficult for anyone to know this truth-to discern the existence
and the practical consequences in action of subjective attitudes
among individuals, much less among collectivities. We run consid
erable personal and social risks, however, if we ignore the subjec
tive dimensions of our individual and collective lives, if we assume
that rational objectivity will govern our conduct simply because we
believe it should do so, or judges tell us it must do so.
Let me articulate one speculation about the possible harm that
would fall on many patients with life-threatening illnesses if physi
cian-assisted suicide were to be legally approved, notwithstanding
the persistence of irrational confusions between physicians and pa
tients. If numerous physicians have resisted acknowledging their
patients' wishes for death because of some deep subjective convic
tion that this acknowledgment would compromise the physicians'
own struggles against feared death-if, we might say, the physi
cians' empathic identification with their patients spilled into an
over-identification with them-then the physicians who now under
stand themselves to be participating in their. patients' deaths
(whether by acquiescing in their treatment refusals or by engaging
in some more active assistance) must somehow accommodate their
prior over-identifications with patients. One possible route is to re
lent in their prior resistance to patients' deaths by denying any em
pathic identification with them-by, we might say, an under
identification with patients, by a heightened aversion to the possi
bility of death that finds expression as a too-quick support for the
patients' hastened death and disappearance in order to deny the
force of the persistent underlying belief that the patients' death
threatens the physicians' personal integrity.
There are already many identifiably powerful social pressures
that are conspiring toward this speeded end: financial pressures
from the new organizational structure of health care services into
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managed care settings that reward nontreatment of patients,ll the
socially marginalized and devalued status of many dying people
such as the impoverished elderly in nursing homes and AIDS-in
fected drug abusers; and the heightened public fears about the dy
ing process that have made Jack Kevorkian a folk hero, in the
media and before successive criminal juries, notwithstanding his ob
vious flouting of legal constraints and his bizarre personal charac
teristics. 12 The "conscience of the medical profession" has often
been invoked as a claimed counterweight to these social forces
pressing toward hastened deaths of patients; but this counterweight
disappears if physicians can persuade themselves that morality de
mands acquiescence in their patients' expressed wishes for death,
no matter how tentative, ,ambivalent, or premature those expressed
wishes might be. What a happy conjunction, then, if "doing good"
for one's patients~oing the socially approved act of hastening the
patient's death-also "felt good" to the physician who, by this has
tening, could avoid any anxiety-provoking acknowledgment of the
personal threat embodied in the patient's death.
The conjunctive impact of these psychological forces with
other social pressures toward hastening the death of vulnerable pa
tients would create considerable problems not only for the proper
implementation of legally recognized physician-assisted suicide but
also for patients' legal rights to refuse treatment. The Second Cir
cuit glibly concluded that because "[t]here is no clear indication
that there has been any problem" regarding implementation of the
widely recognized legal right to refuse treatment,' "there should be
none" as to physician-assisted suicideP But we know that there
11. See, e.g., Steven Miles et aI., End-of-Life Treatment in Managed Care: The
302 (1995).
Potential and the Peril, 163 W.J.
12.. See, e.g., Keith Bradsher, Kevorkian Is Also Painter. His Main Theme Is
Death, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1997, at A10 (describing a public exhibit of his "oil paint
ings depicting severed heads, moldering skulls and rotting corpses" including a "paint
ing about genocide [for which] Dr. Kevorkian said that he had drawn blood from his
own veins to stain the pine frame .... '1 wouldn't recommend anyone hanging them on
a wall,' he said at a press preview on Saturday. 'They're for enjoying; they're for
thinking. "').
13. Quill v. Vacco, 80 F.3d 716, 730 (2d Cir. 1996), rev'd, 138 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1997).
The court stated,
Physicians do not fulfill the role of "killer" by prescribing drugs to hasten .
death any more than they do by disconnecting life-support systems. Likewise,
"psychological pressure" can be applied just as much upon the elderly and
infirm to consent to withdrawal of life-sustaining equipment as to take drugs
to hasten death.

MEn.

Id.
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are current widespread problems in implementing the refusal right.
The problems, at the moment, are excessive physician omis
sions rather than commissions-extensively documented failures by
physicians generally to understand clearly stated legal rules that pa
tients are as much entitled to discontinue treatment as to refuse its
initiation14 and, in large numbers of individual cases, physicians'
failures to acknowledge patients' expressed wishes to refuse or dis
continue treatment. 15 Many people see these failures as evidence
of physician stubbornness, even arrogance, and wrongdoing. From
the alternative perspective that I have been pursuing here, these
failures would convey a different implication. Physicians' mis
perceptions of the legal rules and of their patients' wishes to refuse
treatment, and their resistance to this acknowledgement might indi
cate many physicians' persistent inability to draw objective, logical
distinctions between their patients' lives and their own, between
their own safety and their patients' vulnerability: their continued
confusion about "whose life is it, anyway." From this perspective,
the intensity with which many physicians insist on the sharp differ
entiation between "passive acquiescence" in their patients' refusal
of life-prolonging treatment and "active assistance" in hastening
their patients' death may be part of the physicians' intense struggle
to differentiate themselves from their dying patients. Drawing
sharp lines (even obviously illogical lines) about different degrees
of involvement in patients' deaths may be an instrument in a diffi
cult struggle to hold fast to their traditional ways of maintaining
psychological balance in facing the unsettling force of death.
Even if these psychological speculations were true, this would
not necessarily be a convincing argument for indefinite mainte
nance of obviously illogical distinctions. But if these distinctions
are, as I speculate, playing an important psychological role for
many physicians' conceptions of themselves as different from, and
safely distant from, the dying of their patients; and if the legal sys
tem overrides these distinctions and deprives many physicians of
their customary self-protective instruments, then we must expect
physicians to satisfy these persistent psychological needs in some
other way. It is not at all clear that patients at death's edge would
be better protected under this new regime. This new regime may
help some patients. It may be that some patients-those who are
14. See generally Solomon et aI., supra note 5 (providing statistics regarding the
state of physicians' knowledge and understanding of patients' legal rights).
15. See Connors et aI., supra note 9, at 1594.
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clearly in command of themselves, and firmly want or firmly refuse
hastened death-can, by their assured self-definitions, resist the
force of their physicians' confusions and cognitively unacknowl
edged self-protective maneuvers. More vulnerable patients would
perhaps be swept into a folie a deux with their physicians and bear
the heaviest burden of this shared confusion and disturbance in the
face of death.
I don't know how many patients would be more helped than
harmed by a new legal regime. I don't know how many physicians
are actually struggling in the way that I have depicted. I don't know
the importance for physicians' struggle of the currently regnant
legal distinction between refusing life-prolonging treatment and
hastening death. I don't know how many physicians consciously
disregard these distinctions and purposely hasten their patients'
death; and among these law-breaking physicians, I don't know how·
many find the condemnation of their acts in the formal-though
not enforced-law to be a welcomed inhibition, a secretly reassur
ing constraint that mirrors their own discomfort with their actions.
But for all that I do not know, I am confident that if we ignore all of
these uncertainties and change the legal regime in a way that deeply
unsettles the current conception of physician-patient relations, and
directly contravenes the conventional proposition that "good physi
cians do not kill patients," we cannot now know who and how many
will be hurt more than helped.
Some people say that the current legal regime itself makes it
impossible to resolve these questions as well as many other uncer
tainties, that we can never find answers until physician-assisted sui
cide is practiced openly and is thereby amenable to public scrutiny
and regulation. 16 The paradox in this position is that we can't gain
adequate knowledge about whether we want to change our social
arrangements until after we change our arrangements. The para
dox equally afflicts those who resist change for fear of its unknown
consequences. Perhaps it is possible to try small dosages of legal
change, to self-consciously experiment in these matters in order to
test their consequences without committing ourselves irrevocably to
the questionable changes in social practice and self-conceptions.
But of this, too, I am confident: that constitutionally mandated
16. See Franklin Miller et aI., Regufllting Physician-Assisted Death, 331 NEW ENG.
J. MED. 119, 120 (1994); see also Lawrence Gostin, Drawing a Line Between Killing and
Letting Die: The Law, and Law Reform, on Medically Assisted Dying, 21 J.L. MEo. &
ETHICS 94, 98 (1993). But cf. Ann Alpers & Bernard Lo, Physician-Assisted Suicide in
Oregon: A Bold Experiment, 274 JAMA 483 (1995).
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change in the existing legal regime is not a sufficiently fine-tuned
instrument for this kind of experimentation.
The sweepingly incautious and abrupt character of the consti
tutional rulings by the Second and Ninth Circuits is, in many ways, .
the most extraordinary aspect of these decisions. The practical ef
fect of these rulings, if they are affirmed by the Supreme Court,
would be to overturn the legal regime in every state except for Ore
gon. Assisted suicide is now explicitly prohibited in some 26 states
and would almost certainly be considered criminally punishable in
other states that have not clearly authorized the practice,17 Only
Oregon has explicitly approved physician-assisted suicide; this ap
proval occurred in a popular referendum in 1994 and, because of a
pending constitutional challenge, the law has not yet come into ef
fect. 1s Accordingly, the constitutional right found by the circuit
courts had been recognized by almost no other authoritative body
and had not been practically implemented anywhere in the entire
country.
According to the formal ideology of constitutional law, this vir
tually total absence of popular recognition should have no signifi
cance: constitutional rights are supposed to override popular
approval, not depend on it. It is nonetheless striking that the circuit
court rulings are further removed from any popular recognition,
and more abruptly imposed in the face of popular resistance, than
any other judicial ruling in the history of the constitutional adjudi
cative enterprise. For sheer scope of judicial ambition, the closest
precedents in this century, and even in our entire history, are the
Supreme Court's rulings in Brown v. Board of Education 19 and Roe
v. Wade. 20 But Brown overturned race segregation laws in effect
only in a minority of states (essentially in the former Confederacy
and a few immediately bordering states). Moreover, before issuing
its constitutional proclamation that separate race facilities were "in
herently unequal," the Court had issued a highly visible series of
decisions during the preceding fifteen years that incrementally but
steadily undermined the constitutionally approved status of the

17. See James Bopp & Richard Coleson, The Constitutional Case against Permit
ting Physician-Assisted Suicide for Competent Adults with "Terminal Conditions," 11
ISSUES L. & MED. 239, 249 n.42 (1995).
18. See Lee v. Oregon, 891 F. Supp. 1429 (D. Or. 1995).
19. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
20. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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"separate but equal formula."21 And immediately after formally
proclaiming its new doctrine in Brown, the Court announced that
this ruling would be implemented only gradually; "with all deliber
ate speed,"22 was the Court's cautious watchword for fourteen years
after its apparently sweeping decision in Brown. The Court aban
doned this self-conscious incrementalism only after the United
States Congress had enacted three landmark Civil Rights laws, in
1964, 1965 and 1968, that signified overwhelming national popular
approval for the course that the Court had cautiously embraced in
1954.23
Roe v. Wade was a more precipitous imposition of judicial au
thority than Brown had been. There is even some reason to think
that the Justices construed the apparent popular approval of the
Court's exercise of authority in Brown as a generalized endorse
ment of its role as constitutional censor and thus emboldened it re
garding the abortion controversy. But even so, Roe was a less
radical departure from the existing and popularly approved legal
regime than the current circuit court assisted suicide rulings. When
Roe was decided in 1973, abortion was a legally recognized medical
procedure in every state, though in some two-thirds of the states
limited only to save the mother's life. In one-third of the states,
however, legal abortion was available under relatively liberalized
circumstances (typically to protect the "mental" as well as general
"physical health" of the mother)24-so liberal that in some of these
states, at least, abortion was practically available on demand.25
Moreover, during the three years prior to Roe, the legislatures of
four states-New York, Washington, Alaska and Hawaii-had ex
plicitly approved abortions on demand. 26 Thus, when the Court
proclaimed in Roe that states could not constitutionally prohibit a
first-trimester abortion requested by a woman and accepted by her
personally chosen physician, there was considerable prior popular
approval of and extensive prior social experience with the medical
21. See Robert A. Burt, Constitutionalizing Physician-Assisted Suicide: Will
Lightning Strike Thrice?, 35 DUQ. L. REv. 159, 159-60 (1996).
22.

Brown v. Board of Educ. II, 349 U.S. 294, 301 (1955).

23. See Green v. County Sch. Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
24. See Roe, 410 U.S. at 139-40,40 n.37; MARY ANN GLENDON, ABORTION AND
DIVORCE

IN

WESTERN LAW 48 (1987).

25. See KRISTIN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLmcs OF MOTHERHOOD 88-95
(1984) (regarding California law).
26. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 46-50
(1990).
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practice. There is nothing like this prior approval and no prior ex
perience at all with legally recognized physician-assisted suicide.
This apparently unprecedented character of the exercise of ju
dicial authority in the physician-assisted suicide cases-its distance
from popularly accepted practice and its abrupt sweep-does not
necessarily demonstrate its wrongfulness as a matter of constitu
tional principle. The logic of constitutional decision-making is not
rigidly confined by past precedent. John Marshall's famous declara
tion in 1819 that "we must never forget, that it is a constitution we
are expounding"27 apparently endorses an expansive interpretive
role for the judiciary in construing the sparse terminology of the
constitutional document. This formulation can readily support an
equally expansive conception of judicial authority; the sweeping
moral proclamation enunciated in Brown might in retrospect
eclipse its cautious incrementalism in implementation-a retrospec
tive reading which is given impetus by Roe and finds full flowering
in a judicial proclamation that extends Roe's substantive privacy
principle to overturn state laws banning physician-assisted suicide.28
I cannot refute the internal coherence of this constitutional argu
ment. My instrumental concerns about 'the unknown consequences
of the radical, abrupt shift in social practice regarding legal recogni
tion of physician-assisted suicide are, within the internal logic of
this argument, subordinate to the command of constitutional princi
ple. This command is reminiscent of the old legal maxim fiat jus
tida ruat coe/i, "let justice be done though the heavens fall."
Though some might wish that this instrumental consequence could
be somehow averted, proscribing injustice may nonetheless be pref
erable, a more noble if riskier course.
The very idea of constitutional justice depends, however, on a
methodology of rational discourse: on the possibility of reasoned
argument conducted in a language with acknowledged intersubjec
tive meaning. The conventional depiction of this methodology
treats rationality rather like a ticket of admission for participation
in moral discourse; the participants are obliged, that is, to come into
the enterprise already committed to and engaged in the use of ob
jective reasoning and mutually recognized language. This is, how
ever, a misleading depiction; rationality is better conceived as the
goal of moral discourse not as its precondition.
27. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819).
28. See Robert A. Burt, Alex Bickel's Law School and Ours, 104 YALE L.J. 1853,
1868-69 (1995).
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For most questions, the difference between these two depic
tions may not be especially sharp or consequential. For most ques
tions, interchange-even among passionate adversaries-rather
quickly finds a common language, a shared understanding of the
terms of the argument, even if ultimate substantive agreement does
not readily emerge. There are some issues, however, where these
preconditions for rational deliberation are not easily reached
where the very terms of discourse are heavily freighted with subjec
tive and ordinarily inexpressible significance for one or another of
the participants. In deliberations about such issues, the goal of ra
tionality may seem unattainable and, at the same time, the costs of
abandoning that goal may seem enormous and even terrifying. The
social costs may involve resort to violence as the only means of ad
dressing a high stakes but apparently irresolvable conflict. The in
dividual costs may involve a frightening sense of personal isolation
and incoherence as a consequence of the inability to make one's
deeply felt needs intelligible, much less persuasive to others. For
such issues, these fears set the stage for a kind of forced march to
an apparent rationality-a suppression of, an intolerance for, rather
than a comfortable resolution of the radical subjectivities that are
obstructing the cherished goal of mutual intelligibility. Sometimes
this suppression may itself be a mutually shared enterprise, an im
plicit or unacknowledged agreement to ignore the mutual inability
to find a common language or metric for resolving controversy. In
such circumstances, the apparent resolution is usually quite tenu
ous; disagreements and tensions are likely to arise soon and often.29
At other times, one party who is for whatever reason stronger than
the other simply imposes his terms on the dispute and overrides the
persistent though deeply felt incommensurability of the other. This
too is an unstable, but not uncommon, resolution.
American society today seems transfixed by the problem of in
commensurate disputes: conflicts that traverse the possibility not
only of mutually satisfactory resolution but even of rational dis
course. Our current struggle with the meaning of multicultural
ism-whether recognition of racial, religious, ethnic, gender
differences is inconsistent with or a pathway toward a unifying na
tional self-definition-is one expression of this obsession. I believe

29. For an insightful discussion of the social uses of tenuous dispute resolutions,
see Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things Un
decided, 110 HARV. L. REv. 4 (1996).

366

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 19:353

that the sudden public salience of disputes about death and dying is
another such expression.
If this is true, then public deliberations cannot begin with the
assumption that the preconditions for rational moral discourse have
been satisfied for these disputes. We must instead devise some
means for engaging in a public deliberative process that can lead to
a common language and commensurate metric for moral resolution
of the dispute. Though judicial interventions can play a valuable
facilitative role in this deliberative process, essentially by focussing
public attention on the existence of deep moral conflict and offering
guidance toward the possibilities of acknowledging shared prem
ises, the judiciary-because of its social remoteness and its depen
dence on rational principle-must not impose an authoritative and
conclusive resolution of the dispute when its terms are still morally
incommensurable, when the dispute is not yet amenable to rational
discourse among the adversaries.30
By this criteria, the Supreme Court's sweepingly conclusive
resolution of the abortion controversy in Roe v. Wade was prema
ture; and the morally incommensurable terms in which the abortion
debate was then, and continues to be, debated also shows why the
physician-assisted suicide controversy is still far from morally re
solvable. The centrally disputed question in the abortion debate
about whether the fetus is a "person" who is a recognized member
of our social community in itself points to the absence of a shared
morality to which the disputants can appeal. If we have no com
mon basis for agreement on the identity of the constituent members
of the community, there is no "we" to engage in discourse but only
mutually unintelligible and therefore socially and morally isolated
individuals.
The "personhood" dispute points to one underlying theme in
particular that is common to the claims about abortion and the right
to die: that passage into or out of the human community involves
extraordinary vulnerability; that the threats come not only or even
primarily from biological risks but from social abuses; and that the
medical profession is directly responsible for the infliction of these
abuses. The proposed technique for protecting against abuse is also
similar in the two contexts, though it differs in strategic details of
30. My model for this kind of self-restrained, morally iIIuminating judicial
pedagogy is the Supreme Court's carefully staged deliberative process in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and during the sixteen years before and fourteen
years after that decision. See ROBERT A. BURT, THE CoNSTITUTION IN CONFLICT 271
310 (1992).
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application. The basic protective technique is to control the timing
of the socially recognized designation of "personhood." To guard
against iatric abuse via abortion, the social status of "personhood"
is bestowed at increasingly earlier stages of fetal and even embry
onic biological development; to guard against iatric abuse via tech
nological inflictions-mechanical ventilators, nasogastric tube
feeding, etc.-.during the process of dying, the social status of "per
sonhood" is revoked at increasingly earlier stages of biological de
cline. There is one central strategic difference in establishing the
locus for controlling the timing of this social proclamation. For the
beginning of life, advocates for a "right to life" insist that "per
sonhood" must be communally and univocally defined. For the end
of life, advocates for a "right to die" insist that each individual must
be free to revoke "personhood" by his or her own idiosyncratic
conception, though constrained by a single communal conception of
"mental competence" so that only a socially recognized "person"
would be free to revoke "personhood. "31
These strategic differences are of course significant; but the
heated debates between these antagonists, regarding the virtues of
pluralist vs. univocal standards of "personhood" at both the begin
nings and the endings of life, have obscured a more fundamental
similarity in perspective. Both camps view biological dependency
as a fearful state of social isolation which is not just vulnerable but
is highly likely to attract abuse. The imagery of a "silently scream
ing" fetus, suffering terribly but unattended, has been popularized
by right to life advocates, but it is an equally apt image for the fear
ful invocations by right to die advocates of dying people intubated
and tethered to high-tech machinery in impersonal hospital or nurs
ing home settings.
This commonality between the pro-life and pro-choice advo
cates-their shared sense of social isolation and vulnerability-is,
ironically enough, the basis for their shared diagnosis that the medi
cal profession in particular has betrayed its caretaking role and is
the principal source of abuse. This common ground is not, how
ever, a comfortable basis for enlisting physicians, as a group or as
31. For "mentally incompetent" people, some advocate a communally and univo
cally defined standard to revoke personhood for those without various indicia of cogni
tive or "higher brain" function. Opponents of the "right to die" claim that this
revocation would inevitably and exponentially expand over current categories of senile
and mentally retarded people. For many difficulties in applying standards of mental
incompetence and voluntariness regarding requests for physician-assisted suicide, see
Burt, supra note 21, at 164-77.
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individuals, in any socially ameliorative enterprise. It may be that
the physicians who choose to perform abortions are sufficiently ha
bituated to an impersonal conception of fetal status that they have
no difficulty in declining to see themselves as murderers. The wide
spread, openly acknowledged practice of legalized abortions
throughout the United States prior to Roe v. Wade did provide
some basis for confidence on this score. On the available evidence
regarding physician-assisted suicide, however, there is much less
grounds for comfort. Physicians who feel troubled about assisted
suicide would, as with abortion practice, be free to refuse participa
tion. But if my speculation is correct-if the psychological stakes
are as high as I believe for physicians in particular, and if the psy
chological mechanisms of denial or other suppressions or displace
ments of disturbing thoughts are as readily available as I believe
the stage is set for much confusion between physicians and patients,
much self-justificatory and self-protective conduct by physicians
and persistent, perhaps even intensified, experience of social isola
tion by patients. This is not a confidence-engendering basis for
communal embrace of practice which depends on subtle and sym
pathetic appreciation by physicians of their patients' hard-to-articu
late ambivalences and fears; but adequately protective
implementation of physician-assisted suicide crucially requires this
capacity.
The unusual abruptness of the judicial intervention by the Sec
ond and Ninth Circuit courts, the fact that both courts were in effect
prepared to impose on the entire country through constitutional
command a practice that had been approved only recently in just
one state and not yet implemented even there, was an effort to
reach moral resolution by a forced-march to close off, rather than
to confront difficult questions.
Is it possible that there is no just result regarding physician
assisted suicide? Is it possible that there is no uniform evaluative
matrix for weighing the conflicting needs and interests of vulnera
ble people who will be harmed by its legalized availability and self
assured people who will be helped by it, and therefore no justified
basis for bestowing the trumping card of "rights-bearer" on one of
these claimants? Is it possible that death so utterly dissolves per
sonal identity, the conventionally conceived "self" engaged in mu
tually recognized interchange with others, that the preconditions
for our social conceptions of moral discourse are traversed, that
death itself renders rationality and justice unrecognizable? The
judges in the ruling majorities of the Second and Ninth Circuit ap
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parently denied these possibilities; but they must be sympathetically
considered.

